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Abstract
Confucianism cannot be posited as merely a philosophical tradition, but can nevertheless be 
said to possess key elements of a philosophy of ethics, which have time and again been able to 
transcend both the tradition’s historical as well cultural bounds. While Huang Chun-chieh 
points out that it is more appropriate to speak of Confucianisms, plural, core Confucian val-
ues and notions possess the ability to move from context to context while retaining certain 
characteristics and changing others. The proper approach to the study of Confucianisms 
should therefore be interdisciplinary and in line with the new method of East Asian Confu-
cianisms, where philosophy should also have an important part to play. Understood within 
the bounds of the project of Confucian philosophy (a project that can be seen as dynamic 
and ongoing in the global environment of the 21st century), a broader and more diverse 
range of expressions of Confucian thought—particularly through the methods of both East 
Asian Confucianisms and of comparative philosophy as an effort of a more equal and inclu-
sive philosophical dialogue—could help throw new light on important aspects of Confucian 
philosophical thought. While the methods of East Asian Confucinisms and of comparative 
philosophy are different in their aims and scope, they also share common sensibilities.
Keywords: Huang Chun-chieh, East Asian Confucianisms, Comparative Philosophy, 
Text, Context
Huang Chun-Chieh in primerjalna filozofija: načini proučevanja  
konfucijanskih idej in pojmov skozi različna besedila in kontekste
Izvleček
Konfucijanske tradicije ne moremo razumeti kot zgolj filozofske, lahko pa rečemo, da 
vsebujejo ključne elemente etične filozofije, ki jim je vedno znova uspelo preseči tako 
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svoje zgodovinske kot tudi kulturne okvire. Huang Chun-chieh poudari, da bi bilo tako 
bolj primerno govoriti o konfucijanstvih, torej v množini, osrednje konfucijanske vred-
note pa imajo sposobnost premikanja iz konteksta v kontekst ter po eni strani ohranjajo, 
po drugi pa spreminjajo določene značilnosti. Ustrezen pristop k študiju konfucijanstev 
mora biti zato interdisciplinaren in v skladu z novo metodo vzhodnoazijskih konfuci-
janstev, v takem projektu pa mora imeti pomembno mesto tudi filozofija. Če jih preu-
čujemo v okviru projekta konfucijanske filozofije (projekta, ki je dinamičen in poteka v 
globalnem okolju 21. stoletja), lahko bolj raznoliki izrazi konfucijanske misli – še po-
sebej z metodama vzhodnoazijskih konfucijanstev in primerjalne filozofije kot napora 
enakopravnejšega in inkluzivnejšega filozofskega dialoga – pomagajo na novo osvetli-
ti pomembne vidike konfucijanske filozofske misli. Čeprav se metodi vzhodnoazijskih 
konfucijanstev in primerjalne filozofije razlikujeta v ciljih in obsegu, si delita določeno 
skupno razumevanje.
Ključne besede: Huang Chun-chieh, vzhodnoazijska konfucijanstva, primerjalna filozo-
fija, besedilo, kontekst
Introduction
The article first aims to examine the study of East Asian Confucianisms as pro-
posed by Huang Chun-chieh. The method of East Asian Confucianisms repre-
sents an alternative to the more nationally motivated studies of the Confucian tra-
ditions in the 20th century. It also offers an alternative to the prevailing academic 
methods and models of the past, which were mostly based on the European and 
American cultural experience (see Huang 2013a) and in East Asia resulted in a 
kind of “fidelity studies”. Furthermore, the method also seems to offer an impor-
tant way of revitalizing the field of Confucian ideas in the global context of the 
21st century. The second aim of the article is to examine the relationship between 
the method of East Asian Confucianisms and comparative philosophy as a call for 
more inclusive philosophical dialogues. To show that while the goals and scope 
of the two may differ, there is much overlap and both gain by sharing common 
solutions to common problems.
Huang Chun-chieh shows how the outdated notions of the “centre versus pe-
riphery”, as well as the “orthodox versus heterodox” should be abandoned and the 
field of East Asian Confucianisms seen as an interconnected whole, not in some 
abstract sense, but as a living tradition and a concrete intellectual history. Huang 
Chun-chieh is aware of the problems that the notion of East Asia itself car-
ries, but his proposal for the method of East Asian Confucianisms tackles these 
problems head on. Huang sets out his views on the contextual turn, a concrete 
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historical process in which the canonical Confucian texts are seen as the basis 
of a common discourse among Confucians of all East Asian countries, sharing 
a common Confucian consciousness; but in which such discourse is also always 
influenced by local historical and cultural factors. This leads to the development 
of a kind of intellectual historical approach, but also a kind of comparative Con-
fucian studies field, where different local variants of Confucianism are connected 
by both concrete historical processes as well as by core Confucian values, such as 
self-cultivation and the notion of humaneness (ren 仁).
The comparative philosophical study should not be seen as strictly parallel to the 
method of East Asian Confucianisms, but in many ways, rather as its extension—
as both a study of diverse ideas and an advocacy for more inclusion in the global 
philosophical dialogues. It should learn from the very same processes which are 
under study by the method of East Asian Confucianisms and understand the way 
in which such exchanges happened. The method of East Asian Confucianisms 
has great potential to bring new light to and re-evaluate the rich tapestry of Con-
fucian ideas, as well as different developments of such ideas within the variant tra-
ditions. Comparative philosophy must be seen as a living process of the exchange 
of ideas and a meeting of worldviews which can illuminate invisible paradigms 
and bring about new paradigm shifts.
The method of East Asian Confucianisms strives to solve the many problems 
connected to the political and cultural identities of East Asia and offers compel-
ling solutions in their place. In many ways, comparative philosophy also shares 
many of these problems—those of chauvinism, of a demand for fidelity, and of 
incommensurability—and so the solutions offered can be seen as compelling from 
the point of view of both. These two methods are shown to share many of the 
same sensibilities and should work hand-in-hand. 
East Asian Confucianisms as Both a Field of Study and a Method of 
Humanities
Huang Chun-chieh lays out his project of East Asian Confucianisms as both a 
field of study and a method of humanities, offering a new systematic way of stud-
ying the different Confucian traditions, based on the idea of “unity in diversity” 
(see Huang 2015), focusing on “process over results” (ibid.), and taking into ac-
count the need of scholars in the 21st century to be “thinking from East Asia” (see 
Huang 2013a). Huang argues that “‘East Asian Confucianisms’ is an intellectual 
community that is transnational and multi-lingual. It has evolved in the interac-
tion between Confucian ‘universal values’ and the local conditions present in each 
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East Asian country” (Huang 2015, 7). He furthermore sets out the rationale for 
such a field of study:
The rationale for proposing East Asian Confucianisms as a field of study 
is twofold. On the one hand ‘East Asian Confucianisms’ embraces the 
Confucian traditions of China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. One the other 
hand, the varied Confucian traditions in these cultures did not form a 
mechanical assemblage, but rather a comprehensive, developing, system-
atic whole. (ibid., 11)
While the Confucian tradition may have originated in the Shandong peninsu-
la over two millennia ago, it was originally only a “local wisdom” (ibid., 16). It 
then went on to develop its own set of values that had by the 17th century been 
transmitted across a number of East Asian countries, where they were met by 
differing local environments. Huang points out that notions such as the distinc-
tion between the Chinese and barbarians (huayi zhibian 華夷之辨), loyalty or 
doing one’s best (zhong 忠) and of filial piety (xiao 孝) “all strongly reflect specific 
features of Chinese culture and are deeply rooted and coloured by the culture’s 
agrarian economy, clan society, and authoritarian order” (ibid.), so “it is not sur-
prising that as these ideas spread outside of China to Korea and Japan, tensions 
appeared due to the differences in regional conditions. Such tensions then caused 
a transformation in Confucian ideas, changing them into diverse versions of East 
Asian Confucianisms” (ibid.).
This process can primarily be seen in two ways. Firstly, it brought diverse inter-
pretations and valuations to the readings of Confucian canonical texts such as 
the Lunyu 論語 (Analects) and the Mengzi 孟子 (Mencius), the Zhongyong 中庸 
(Doctrine of the Mean) and the Daxue 大學 (Great Learning). And secondly, many 
of the ideas and notions of Chinese Confucianism were themselves reinterpreted 
when they reached other East Asian countries like Korea and Japan. For example, 
Huang argues that the meanings of such core concepts as gong 公 (public, fair), 
si 私 (personal, private), xin 心 (mind-heart or heart-mind), zhong 忠 and xiao 
孝 went through radical changes, and these notions attracted entirely different 
interpretations, for example, in Japan (ibid., 17–18). Thus “far from a uniform 
broadcast of Chinese Confucianism, East Asian Confucianisms exhibits a rich 
diversity rooted in the various local milieu and specific ethnic cultures of those 
regions” (ibid., 18).
Huang argues that East Asian Confucianisms as a field of study and a method 
represent a “unity in diversity” (ibid., 9) and notes:
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The special feature, the wholeness, of East Asian Confucianisms exists in 
the midst of and not over and above the cultural and intellectual exchange 
activities among the respective East Asian countries. Consequently, they 
must be regarded as a sort of continuously evolving family of intellectu-
al traditions. Although this sort of temporal and continuously evolving 
family has historical roots in the pre-Qin Confucian school, as soon as 
the downward and outward flow of Confucianism encountered different 
cultures and societies of other times and places, distinctive Confucian 
trademarks of each place were formed and set. We must appreciate that 
while Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200) learning is very different from the hu-
manist school of Neo-Confucianism, the difference between Chinese, 
Japanese, and Korean Zhu Xi learning is even greater. Therefore, research 
in East Asian Confucianisms cannot countenance such theoretical pre-
suppositions as “orthodox versus heterodox” or “centre versus periphery”. 
(Huang 2018, 77)
Trying to answer Tsuda Sōkichi’s 津田左右吉 (1873–1961) objection to the idea 
of “East Asian civilization”, Huang presents the field of East Asian Confucian-
isms both as a kind of “reality of history” and as the “method of the humanities” 
(Thompson 2017, 13–14). He argues, firstly, that through the lens of the field 
of East Asian Confucianisms the distinctions such as the “centre versus periph-
ery” and of “orthodox versus heterodox” can be overcome and the concept of East 
Asian Confucianisms itself can be set up as “a ‘method’ that illuminates concrete 
processes whereby the so-called peripheries form their own respective versions of 
Confucianism” (Huang 2015, 14). And, secondly, that through the study of inter-
connected historical developments of the ideas of Chinese, Korean, Japanese and 
Vietnamese Confucianisms, East Asian Confucianisms can be shown to emerge 
as a system of thought with distinct East Asian characteristics (ibid., 12).
And yet Huang is also cognizant of the fact that the notion of East Asian Confu-
cinisms carries with it a great historical burden.
For example, the memory of imperial Japan’s announcement of its am-
bition to establish a “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” in 1933, 
now understood as Japan’s pretext for invading East Asia, causes deep, 
gut-wrenching pain to the peoples of East Asia, particularly in China 
and Korea. Consequently, down to the present, the term “East Asia” is 
heavily burdened with historical baggage. With the rise of China at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century, memories of the historical Chinese 
empire have begun to engage the attention of the academic world. It is a 
Azijske_studije_2020_3_FINAL.indd   95 9. 09. 2020   13:21:15
96 Marko OGRIZEK: Huang Chun-Chieh and Comparative Philosophy
historical fact that “East Asian Confucianisms” arose on the Shandong 
Peninsula some 2,500 years ago, and some scholars suspect that if China 
develops into a superpower in the twenty-first century then the advocacy 
of the values of “East Asian Confucianisms” in China would simply lead 
to an atavistic revival of “national” Chinese learning and culture in the 
twenty-first century. (Huang 2018, 81)
Huang identifies the two main problems of the notion of East Asian Confucian-
isms as 1) the problem of the conflict between political and cultural identity faced 
by Confucians in all of the East Asian countries, and 2) the problem of how the 
cultural subjectivity of Confucians in each East Asian country can manifest itself 
in shared universal values (ibid., 82).
By presenting “East Asian Confucianisms” as a methodology rather than as a 
reality, Huang is trying to avoid its being subverted into an illicit new-imperialist 
discourse (ibid., 81). He also tries to show that while national political identities 
of East Asian Confucians are harder to transcend, “from the perspective of cultur-
al identity, Confucians in each of the East Asian countries also shared the Confu-
cian core values of ren 仁 and self-cultivation. Hence, these Confucian common 
core values ultimately transcended national boundaries and can be regarded as 
values that might be shared by all of humankind” (ibid.). Ideas that were able to 
transcend national boundaries, were able to do so because they possess universal 
appeal.
Huang also argues that the study of East Asian Confucianisms, instead of focus-
ing on the results, should rather focus on the process by which different Confu-
cian subjectivities were formed.
Interpreted in this sense, Confucianism becomes a parameter for the for-
mation of the subjectivities of each and every East Asian region. What is 
important to observe here is the process by which such specific subjectivity 
is constructed, be it in Japan or Korea, not the “authenticity” or “ortho-
doxy” of a specific regional Confucianism. “East Asian Confucianisms” 
are not something ready-cast, nor a frame of thought that exists above 
the concrete process of the development of Confucianisms in Korea, 
Japan, and Taiwan. Rather it exists only in the interactive formations 
among East Asian regions, including China, Korea, Japan, Taiwan and 
Vietnam. (Huang 2015, 14)
East Asian Confucianisms as a field and method of study then also arises from the 
way Confucianism had been studied and used to prop up national identities in the 
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past (see for instance Hmeljak Sangawa 2017, 154–55; Culiberg 2015, 232). The 
problems of its notions are exactly the ones Huang Chun-chieh aims to overcome 
with his new methodology.
[W]e can view the rise of the field of East Asian Confucianisms on the 
new stage of scholarship in the twenty-first century as a reaction to the 
form of Confucian studies conducted in the Chinese-language academia 
of the twentieth century. For example, twentieth-century Chinese New 
Confucian philosophers tended to view Confucianism narrowly as a seg-
ment of their national and ethnic identity, especially as bound up with 
the vast and far-reaching historical traumas and transformations of the 
early twentieth century. (Huang 2018, 79)
East Asian Confucianisms emerges as a project that aims to overcome such prob-
lems of the past by accounting for the subjectivity of all East Asian countries 
within a common Confucian world of ideas—taking into account the different 
developments of a common core of ideas and notions within different local envi-
ronments and cultural contexts. Thus this becomes in effect the study of the inter-
subjectivity of East Asian subjectivities. Being well aware of both the political and 
cultural historical issues that burden the notion of East Asia as any kind of cul-
tural and political entity, Huang is proposing to overcome such difficulties within 
the field of study of Confucian thought by overcoming exactly the historical and 
political notions of the “centre versus periphery”, historically represented, for ex-
ample, by the Chinese Empire and its tributary system, built upon the difference 
between the Chinese and barbarians (see Huang 2013a).
On the other hand, the method of East Asian Confucianisms seems to also offer 
a compelling way to revitalize the studies of Confucian ideas themselves, by being 
both respectful of the cultural diversity of East Asian countries while also follow-
ing the common philosophical threads that link the different interpretations of 
these ideas and notions. The development of Confucian ideas and notions within 
the different variant Confucian traditions is freed from the constraints of the “or-
thodox versus heterodox” debates, and reconnected into a common world of core 
Confucian values, seen as having transcended national boundaries and thus pos-
sessing universal appeal. As the Confucians of different East Asian countries read 
the same classics and reflected on them within their own historical, cultural and 
political environments, commented on them and discussed them among them-
selves, they developed a common Confucian consciousness, though they retained 
their political identities. The principle of “unity in diversity” proposed by Huang 
seems like a productive approach to the revitalization of the philosophical study of 
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Confucian ideas in the 21st century global environment.And finally, while Huang 
stresses that he certainly does not mean to argue for the creation of any sort of 
“reflexive Orientalism”, much less any kind of self-absorbed “national learning”, 
he does point out that:
[T]he necessity of advocating “East Asian Confucianisms” as a distinct 
field is a proactive intellectual response to the predilection of those twen-
tieth-century East Asian academicians who have interpreted the East 
according to the West. In this sense, East Asian Confucianisms manifests 
the vital mission to revisit the Confucian core values as the mainstream 
of East Asian cultures that might be expanded to provide the foundation 
of a new Humanism for the age of globalization. (Huang 2018, 80–81)
Built upon the principle of “thinking from East Asia”, the method of East Asian 
Confucianisms argues for setting an alternative to the academic trends of the 
past—where the East had always been interpreted according to the West—and to 
form a method of study that takes into account the specific circumstances and ex-
periences of East Asia (see Huang 2013a). This, again, is not to say that Huang is 
arguing for the creation of any kind of “reflexive Orientalism”, it is rather a stance 
which argues against those models and trends of the past, that brought about the 
“fidelity studies” relationship between Europe and East Asia, and also argues for 
a wider and a more inclusive idea of “universal values” than has been effectively 
observed in the past. 
Stressing the importance of studying both the different local variants of Con-
fucianism, but also the common core of ideas that connects them, Huang’s pro-
ject aims at excavating those “universal Confucian values and ideas”—ideas that 
were able to transcend national boundaries and have thus proven to possess uni-
versal appeal. In understanding the processes by which these values and notions 
had already negotiated their places within different cultural contexts of East 
Asia, Huang presents a vision of bringing these same processes and values to the 
global stage.
East Asian Confucianisms is a unique and self-formed systematic study. 
It is not just a mechanical piecemeal assemblage of regional versions of 
Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and Vietnamese Confucianisms. Rather, as 
Confucians in each of these places recite and are immersed in the same 
classics, they aspire to become the sages in Confucian core values, tran-
scending regional limitations. This common core of Confucianism forms 
a system of thought without the stigmas of centre-border and means-
end discriminations. “East Asian Confucianisms” is a field of study that 
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rids us of the vestiges of boundaries and limitations that still remain in 
the present time and takes in East Asia as a whole. In our present era 
of globalization, we find that in various traditions of East Asian Con-
fucianisms there exist important spiritual resources that could facilitate 
dialogue among world civilizations. (Huang 2015, 19)
Texts in Contexts, Actors in History
As a method, East Asian Confucianisms stresses “process over results”. Not be-
ing interested in the image of a static and perfect version of a common East 
Asian culture, East Asian Confucianisms studies the historical processes by which 
Confucian ideas had historically negotiated their place within different cultural 
contexts; but it also studies the different interpretations themselves and the rich-
ness of meaning that such processes produced. It thus possesses both an aspect 
of intellectual history as well as an aspect of comparative studies, and has the 
potential to bring about both a better understanding of the historical processes of 
the diversification of ideas, as well as a deeper understanding of how ideas survive 
such processes and are enriched by them.
Confucianism is a diverse tradition, rich in both ideas and practice. When try-
ing to pinpoint the thread that connects different variant Confucian traditions, 
Huang identifies two major basic principles that connect them all together—
firstly, the nature of Confucianism as a practical philosophy and family ethics; and 
secondly, the central Confucian notion of ren 仁.
Confucians in all of the East Asian countries firmly believe that the 
foundation and starting point of Confucianism lay in a self-cultivation 
process that involves extending sympathy—proceeding along a con-
tinuum from self, to family, to society, to state, then on to world. East 
Asian Confucians all hold, in effect, that the transformation of self is 
the starting point of transforming the world. […] Fundamentally, East 
Asian Confucian philosophies are constituted as practical philosophies 
of self-cultivation approaches and family ethics. (Huang 2018, 78)
The notion of the family as the central metaphor of Confucian ethics has been 
discussed by Rosemont and Ames2, who have also tried to convincingly argue for 
a new interpretation of Confucian ethics as a system of ethics sui generis that does 
2 See for example Rosemont and Ames’s introduction to their translation of The Chinese Classic of 
Family Reverence (Rosemont and Ames 2009, 1–64). 
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not have a simple equivalent in the Western philosophical tradition (Rosemont 
and Ames 2016). The notion of self-cultivation also marks the Confucian tra-
dition in a fundamental way, as it charges Confucian scholars with not simply 
thinking about the right way of living, but also practicing it and advocating for 
it. While Confucian notions may have originated from the canonical Confucian 
texts, they cannot remain abstract and above Confucian practices—they are al-
ways drawn to the everyday life of the practitioners. 
And Confucian practice itself is as diverse as the ways that people have historical-
ly used to cultivate themselves.
The “practice” of Confucianism […] depended on historical context. It 
could be a mix of various elements that we today might describe using 
adjectives including religious, political, literary, artistic, educational, sci-
entific, medical, and many others. So Confucianism is/was a religion in 
some manifestations, a political science in others, a literary practice or 
medical tradition in others. Most often it was a constellation of several of 
those and more. The nature of that constellation differed depending on 
the particular historic moment and society within which Confucianism 
manifested. (Paramore 2016)
Still, Huang argues that East Asian Confucianisms can be seen to form a co-
herent world of ideas—ideas through which Confucians of different countries, 
who read the same ancient Classics, were setting themselves on the same path of 
becoming truly human (of even becoming Confucian sages). And at the centre of 
Confucian ethics is most certainly the notion of ren 仁. 
The second core value shared in common by the Confucians of each East 
Asian country and tradition is Confucius’ teaching of ren 仁, rendered 
variously in English as “humanity”, “humaneness”, “humane hearted-
ness”, “benevolence”, and “authoritative personhood”. (Huang 2018, 78)
Humaneness is central among those Confucian notions that had been developed 
across many historical eras and many different cultural contexts. As notions such 
as ren gather nuance in meaning, they also gather interpretative power and the 
power to open up discussions among Confucian scholars of different countries. 
A great example of this that Huang himself studies at length is the discourse on 
Zhu Xi’s interpretation of the notion of ren 仁, presented in his Ren shuo 仁説 
(Treatise on Humaneness), which in following centuries created a greater reaction 
in both Korean Confucianism, as well as in Edo period 江戸 Japan (1603–1868). 
Through the Japanese scholars’ answers to Zhu Xi, for example, Huang observes 
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a common preference for practical learning over metaphysical discussions as one 
of the main characteristics of Japanese Confucianism.3
Another important aspect of the method of East Asian Confucianisms is not only 
in recognizing Confucianism as a common world of ideas, but also in recognizing 
the inherent open and dialogical nature of the Confucian tradition itself—that 
more than anything Confucianism can be seen as a shared and open discourse 
on the ideas and notions set out in the canonical Confucian literature and devel-
oped through the countless lives of people striving to cultivate themselves in the 
way of Confucius, enriching the Confucian way and passing it on. Even the very 
nature of the Analects and Confucius’ pragmatic teaching can be seen to facilitate 
this.4 Thus Confucian notions themselves necessarily invite reinterpretations, but 
these are such that they do not necessarily invalidate the previously established 
meanings.
The interplay between meaning and practice is the way of Confucian ideas and 
notions—and is also the way in which they are transmitted across contexts. The 
tension between the “universal values” of Confucianism and the local environ-
ments in which they were being reinterpreted can also be readily observed in 
history, as this process was not invisible or unreflected upon. It was a part of the 
same lively intellectual conversation, and was carried out beyond the groups of 
Confucians in each country. New meaning was being introduced into a new local 
environment, but at the same time it was being introduced in such a way that the 
environment could absorb and naturalize it—so this represented not only a kind 
of conversation, but also a kind of negotiation; and the Confucians of each coun-
try were not only scholars, but also advocates for these ideas.5 
On the one hand these processes produced differences—but seen from the point 
of view of East Asian Confucianisms they also produced a kind of richness.
[C]onsider Confucius’s Analects, a classic produced in China’s intellectual 
culture. The spiritual homeland of Confucius was concerned with man-
aging the world, and yet it also had its broad, deep, and transcendent as-
pirations. Confucius and his disciples were able to find […] spirituality in 
the ethical relationships of daily life. After the Analects was transmitted 
east to Japan, however, Tokugawa 徳川 (1603–1868) Confucian scholars 
3 For an overview of how Zhu Xi’s Treatise of Humaneness was discussed in Japan and ways in which 
Japanese scholar had criticized Zhu Xi’s definition of the notion, see for example Huang 2015, 
113–30.
4 For a discussion on Confucius’ pragmatic approach to words in the Analects, see Yang 2007.
5 For a study of the naturalization of Confucianism in Japan, see Wildman Nakai 1980.
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discarded the intellectual world of the text’s Chinese cultural context 
(including such concepts as Heaven, the Way, human nature, and desti-
ny) and recontextualized it in the practical realism that typified Japanese 
intellectual tendencies. They thereby assimilated the Analects to Japanese 
culture, so that it became a link to the spiritual world of Japanese intellec-
tuals for the next three centuries. Only because it underwent this process 
of recontextualization by Japanese scholars did the Analects become gen-
erally congenial to Japanese intellectuals. Additionally, because Japanese 
scholars had recontextualized the Analects, Tokugawa scholars were able 
to read in new meanings for the age, and thus could infuse the text with 
a new significance. (Huang 2013a)
The process can be seen as twofold, when considered in this positive light. First-
ly, it allowed Confucianism to naturally overcome its internal cultural tensions, 
produced by such notions as the difference between the Chinese and barbarians 
or that of the “middle kingdom” (Zhongguo 中國). These notions are transmitted 
to a new local environment, where they are infused with new meaning and are, 
through a kind of negotiation and advocacy, developed within a new cultural con-
text. Of course, as shown by the study of variant Confucian traditions, from the 
point of view of meaning this is not a one-way street of enrichment of notions—
this critical process, this negotiation, both adds and subtracts certain dimensions; 
but seen from the point of view of the method of East Asian Confucianisms, 
where previous meanings are not lost, but studied in a common world of ideas, 
new meanings simply add both nuance and universal appeal.
As has been remarked upon, this living and rewarding process can be observed in 
the history of ideas itself, not simply in and abstract way.
Viewed from the perspective of the experience of cultural exchanges in 
East Asia (via the exchange of texts, ideas, and people), all exchanges take 
place in the contexts of society, politics, and culture. Even the languag-
es spoken by the people involved in these exchanges have their specific 
linguistic contexts. For this reason, people on both sides of the cultural 
exchange must be viewed as performers on the stage of history, and ex-
changes should be viewed as historical events. When we begin from this 
perspective, we can enter into a better method for studying decontextu-
alization in the history of cultural exchange in East Asia. (Huang 2013a)
But if the method of East Asian Confucianisms here comes close to what might 
be considered as intellectual history, it also possesses an undeniable compara-
tive aspect, especially when the ideas and notions presented are studied for their 
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meaning and philosophical significance. If the different variant Confucanisms are 
not only to be defined by their cultural contexts, but are also taken to be philo-
sophically or practically distinct, then the variant traditions and their developed 
notions are necessarily compared among themselves for such distinctions to be 
made apparent. And while intellectual history has traditionally been studied more 
within national boundaries of different East Asian countries and had been closely 
connected to national identities, it is this comparative approach—one which si-
multaneously overcomes the divide of “centre versus periphery”, “orthodox versus 
heterodox”, which adds new possibilities to the study of Confucian texts within 
contexts in more productive ways.
Last but not least, the method of East Asian Confucianisms also seems to un-
derstand that the project of the study of Confucian ideas must extend along a 
line: from studying the common core of Confucian ideas—Confucian canonical 
literature—to studying the variant traditions of Confucianism in China, Korea, 
Japan and Vietnam, affording them equal status inside the family of intellectual 
traditions and observing the historical developments of Confucian ideas within 
each; and finally, to studying the teachings and works of those concrete actors in 
history, those Confucian scholars and advocates of Confucian ideas who devoted 
their lives in service of studying and following the Confucian way. Only such a 
comprehensive study which takes into consideration both the different contexts 
as well as the different texts within those different contexts can yield the best 
results.
To respect the historical tendencies, socio-political factors and conceptual orien-
tations, but also the intention and personal projects of those Confucian thinkers 
themselves, one has therefore to seek a balance between studying the texts and 
studying their contexts. As Huang puts it:
Cultural interactions are dynamic processes. For this reason, in research-
ing decontextualization and reconceptualization in cultural exchanges, if 
we rely solely on […] textualism, we will find ourselves “buried in words”, 
to resurrect the ridicule of Qing Confucians. Yet if we [only] examine the 
production and movement of new meanings after ideas or texts were in-
troduced into different regions and carefully consider the factors behind 
the new meanings against their historical background (contextualism), 
we will be blind to the whole. For this reason, whenever we choose be-
tween the approaches of textualism and contextualism, we must strive 
to seek a dynamic balance between them in order to avoid being either 
illogical or impractical. (Huang 2013a, 20)
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East Asian Confucianisms and Comparative Philosophy
Among different comparative disciplines, comparative philosophy can be argued 
to hold a specific place. As Botz-Bornstein points out:
Among the numerous comparative disciplines practiced in academic re-
search (e.g., comparative literature, comparative religion, or comparative 
linguistics), comparative philosophy has an outstanding position. In the 
case of comparative literature, it is not really the subject of the discipline 
(e.g., “literature”) that engages one in comparative activities; rather, a cer-
tain “science of literature” compares its subjects to each other. Also, in the 
case of comparative religion, we do not really mean that “religion” itself 
would become comparative but rather that a “comparative science of re-
ligion” compares different religions. The exceptional status of philosophy 
becomes clear here. Philosophy, by comparing different philosophies to 
each other, does not become a “comparative science of philosophy”, but is 
philosophy. (Botz-Bornstein 2006, 157)
But if comparative philosophy is philosophy, then what does “comparative” add 
to the normal discipline of philosophy? Should not philosophy already be also 
comparative by its very nature? Goto-Jones points out that the answer to such a 
question might in fact not be so easy: “[T]he question of the nature and dimen-
sions of comparative philosophy is tied inextricably and deeply to the perennial of 
question, what is philosophy? Indeed, it may be the same question.” (Goto-Jones 
2013, 138)
The question of what is philosophy is certainly beyond the scope of the present 
article—as is, it seems, the question of what exactly is comparative philosophy in 
and of itself: what, if anything, should be considered its canonical texts, what is its 
fundamental methodology, what is its place within the discipline of philosophy 
as such. But at the very least it can be argued broadly that comparative philos-
ophy has heretofore been a specific way in which European-American philo-
sophical traditions relate to other (non-European, non-American) traditions of 
thought. And while it has been asserted in this article that Confucianism should 
also be considered a philosophical tradition, this assertion is already one which 
may not necessarily be completely uncontroversial outside the field of compara-
tive philosophy.
While Kiri Paramore argues that “any account of the existential, practical, and 
resolutely historical nature of [Confucian] tradition makes it more (and certainly 
less) than what would be defined as ‘philosophers’ doing ‘philosophy’ within the 
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contemporary Western context” (Paramore 2016), it can also be argued that de-
fining philosophy only in such a narrow way actually traps it inside its specific 
Europe-America centric expression, and robs it of much of its universal potential 
and dignity. It is precisely this narrow view—of a kind of “true” or “professional” 
philosophy—which comparative philosophy is set against. 
Huang and Tucker therefore offer a much broader reading of the notion of 
philosophy:
What [is here understood] by philosophy consists of […] [the] sort of 
ongoing engagement in critical, self-reflective discussion of and specula-
tive theorizing about ethics, epistemology, metaphysics, political theory, 
and spiritual problems, as well as aesthetics, cosmology, and ontology, 
with the goal being the attainment of a more profound understanding 
of ourselves, others, the world, and the universe at large. Confucians in 
East Asia have been doing this for over two millennia, since the time of 
Confucius. (Huang and Tucker 2014, 4)
Described in these broader terms, philosophy is freed to encompass non-Europe-
an and non-American traditions, but is again faced with the problem of defining 
the relationships between ideas and even whole worldviews belonging to one or 
another of those traditions. As philosophy has historically tended to prioritize 
notions, values and ideas that have been developed within the European-Ameri-
can philosophical traditions, and in European languages, other traditions have in 
the global context for a long time been interpreted according to these ideas and 
through these languages. The task of comparative philosophy is then not only to 
bring philosophers of different traditions to the same table, but actually and more 
importantly to bring them to each other’s libraries and force them to learn to read 
and think anew.
As Botz-Bornstein points out, there is actually a certain inner self-contradiction 
to the notion of comparative philosophy:
Comparative philosophy is identified by an inner self-contradiction: on 
the one hand, philosophy, like literature and art, is part of a cultural expe-
rience that cannot be fully materialized because it is an intimate process. 
In principle, such intimate processes cannot be “compared” (there is, e.g., 
no “comparative art”). On the other hand, philosophy is itself one of those 
materializing disciplines that attempt to transform culture, art, religion, 
et cetera into something that can be “grasped” through concepts, ideas, 
and notions and—finally—be compared. (Botz-Bornstein 2006, 157–58)
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Philosophy as a cultural experience and intimate process is transformed through 
philosophy as one of the materializing disciplines into something which can be 
grasped—but in its striving for universality can actually lose sight of itself as a 
cultural experience and intimate process. Comparative philosophy forces what 
is grasped to be also compared and offers specific philosophical traditions the 
chance to recognize other philosophical traditions as also cultural experiences and 
intimate processes, and in doing so to recognize itself as such as well, and to finally 
re-examine its own universality. 
Goto-Jones remarks: 
[E]ither comparative philosophy is not about philosophy at all, or it is the 
richest and fullest expression of the philosophical endeavor, which means 
that we must revisit what it means to be a professional philosopher. In 
this frame, contemporary comparative philosophy is a kind of suicidal 
endeavor, striving to make itself redundant through the transformation 
of philosophy per se into a more inclusive field. (Goto-Jones 2013, 136)
But while one can in one’s mind’s eye imagine a sort of fantastical and abstract 
meeting of ideas in a fanciful world of their own, interestingly enough, it is the 
method of East Asian Confucianisms and the study of Confucian traditions which 
offers some insight into the nature of such exchanges. What the method of East 
Asian Confucianisms is very cognizant of is that it was exactly the concrete ex-
change of texts, ideas and people that helped Confucian ideas transcend national 
boundaries—it was not some abstract movement, strange meeting or imagined 
battle of ideas. It was in the encounter of people with those ideas, people with those 
texts and people with others in whom these processes had in fact been played out.
Comparative philosophy presumably yearns to be able to set up a stage for such 
encounters, but it must also understand that the only way these exchanges happen 
is through the dedicated work of dedicated people, who in themselves become 
able to transcend their particular traditions and worldviews. And so, in the end, 
the project of comparative philosophy, like that of the transmission and contextual 
turn of Confucian notions, might yet depend less on transforming philosophy it-
self (which should not really need such a transformation), but rather on reforming 
what it actually means to be a philosopher in the 21st century. Like the Confucian 
scholars of old could not be the transmitters of those ideas without not only im-
mersing themselves in them, striving to understand and to follow the way, but in 
many ways also becoming their advocates.6
6 For this process in Japan, again see Wildman Nakai 1980.
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And when philosophers take up this task, do not then the same problems of the 
intersubjectivity of various subjectivities that they might represent, addressed in 
some ways by the method of East Asian Confucianisms, also show themselves 
in the field comparative philosophy? In fact, the method of East Asian Confu-
cianisms might be able to offer compelling solutions for both fields. Through 
its striving to overcome the notions of “centre versus periphery” and “orthodox 
versus heterodox”, the method can address the problems of chauvinism. Through 
the idea of focusing on the “process instead of results”, the method addresses 
the problem of seeing philosophical traditions as static and forever in their ideal 
forms. In studying the variant traditions as well as the common core of ideas, 
focusing on a kind of “concrete universal” (see Huang 2013a) the method of East 
Asian Confucianisms addresses both the universal as well as the particular. 
In all these points, comparative philosophy should nurture similar sensibilities. 
And what this actually means is that philosophers should nurture them.
If the project of East Asian Confucianisms is also in excavating core Confucian 
ideas and values—ideas that have been able to survive the contextual turn and 
be enriched by it, that have demonstrated their universal appeal—then compar-
ative philosophy can perhaps train philosophers for the new kind of exchange of 
ideas in the global context of the 21st century, by looking at those processes and 
learning from them. But while trying to follow the solutions to various problems 
offered by the method of East Asian Confucianisms, for the opening of more 
inclusive and harmonious dialogues, comparative philosophy should also remain 
a more confrontational project, both towards philosophy as such and in its task of 
bringing together philosophers of different traditions, for its most lasting appeal 
remains in the way in which it might not only be able to reveal those hidden par-
adigmatic differences, but also bring about new paradigmatic shifts. 
Both methods should work hand-in-hand to help construct a new philosophical 
approach for the 21st century to both Confucianisms as well to philosophy. As 
Henry Rosemont puts it:
If we are reluctant to participate in the requiem mass currently being 
offered for philosophy, if we wish instead to seek new perspectives that 
might enable the discipline to become as truly all-encompassing in 
the future as it has mistakenly been assumed to have been in the past, 
we must begin to develop a more international philosophical language 
which incorporates the insights of all of the world-wide historical tra-
dition of thinkers who addressed the questions of who and what we are, 
and why and how we should lead our all-too-human lives. (Rosemont 
2016, 56–57)
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Conclusion
East Asian Confucianisms as a field and method proposed by Huang Chun-chieh, 
based on the principles of “unity in diversity”, “process over results” and “thinking 
from East Asia”, is a comprehensive project, which, though not a philosophical 
project per se, also offers a viable way of revitalizing the study of Confucian phil-
osophical ideas across East Asian variant Confucian traditions. As it deals with 
the intersubjectivity of East Asian cultural subjectivities, it possesses many of the 
same sensibilities and offers compelling solutions to problems facing both it and 
the method of comparative philosophy. 
Since Confucianism can be seen as both a philosophical as well as a richly prac-
tical tradition, the study of East Asian Confucianism necessarily demands an 
interdisciplinary approach, which can help highlight different cultural nuances. 
But the study of Confucian ideas itself represents both an effort in intellectual 
history as well as philosophy—and the effort of comparative philosophy with 
regard to opening up the discipline to a wider inclusivity. The study of the di-
verging interpretations of Confucian ideas, stemming from the varied cultural 
peculiarities and contexts they arose in, also highlights the ways in which Con-
fucian ideas are transformed without losing their “universal appeal”. In studying 
the historical processes and historical actors within them, the method of East 
Asian Confucianisms illuminates the work of Confucian scholars across East 
Asia—not only of studying Confucian ideas, but also of practicing and advo-
cating for them. 
It is comparative philosophy which in a sense is trying to bring about such a 
shift in the global context. Transforming philosophy to be more inclusive actually 
means reforming the attitudes of philosophers, and in this comparative philoso-
phers can also learn from those Confucian scholars who in the past had been the 
students of new ideas and their advocates. Comparative philosophy should study 
Confucian ideas both as philosophy and comparative philosophy. Moreover, as 
both the method of East Asian Confucianisms as well as comparative philosophy 
seem to be striving to open up ways of the more inclusive discussions of ideas, 
they should be employed together.
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